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Abstract. The rock-paper-scissor game – which is characterized by three strategies R,P,S, sat-
isfying the non-transitive relations S excludes P, P excludes R, and R excludes S – serves as a
simple prototype for studying more complex non-transitive systems. For well-mixed systems where
interactions result in fitness reductions of the losers exceeding fitness gains of the winners, classical
theory predicts that two strategies go extinct. The effects of spatial heterogeneity and dispersal
rates on this outcome are analyzed using a general framework for evolutionary games in patchy
landscapes. The analysis reveals that coexistence is determined by the rates at which dominant
strategies invade a landscape occupied by the subordinate strategy (e.g. rock invades a landscape
occupied by scissors) and the rates at which subordinate strategies get excluded in a landscape
occupied by the dominant strategy (e.g. scissor gets excluded in a landscape occupied by rock).
These invasion and exclusion rates correspond to eigenvalues of the linearized dynamics near single
strategy equilibria. Coexistence occurs when the product of the invasion rates exceeds the product
of the exclusion rates. Provided there is sufficient spatial variation in payoffs, the analysis identi-
fies a critical dispersal rate d∗ required for regional persistence. For dispersal rates below d∗, the
product of the invasion rates exceed the product of the exclusion rates and the rock-paper-scissor
metacommunities persist regionally despite being extinction prone locally. For dispersal rates above
d∗, the product of the exclusion rates exceed the product of the invasion rates and the strategies
are extinction prone. These results highlight the delicate interplay between spatial heterogeneity
and dispersal in mediating long-term outcomes for evolutionary games.
Author’s Summary: The rock-paper-scissor game, which might initially seem to be of purely
theoretical interest, plays an important role in describing the behavior of various real-world sys-
tems including the evolution of alternative male mating strategies in the side-blotched lizard, the
evolution of bacterial populations, and coexistence in plant communities. While the importance
of dispersal in mediating coexistence for these intransitive communities has been documented in
theoretical and empirical studies, these studies have, by in large, ignored the role of spatial het-
erogeneity in mediating coexistence. We introduce and provide a detailed analysis of models for
evolutionary games in a patchy environment. Our analysis reveals that spatial heterogeneity coupled
with low dispersal rates can mediate regional coexistence, despite species being extinction prone
in all patches. The results suggests that diversity is maintained by a delicate interplay between
dispersal rates and spatial heterogeneity.
Keywords: rock-scissors-paper game, non-transitive interactions, evolutionary game theory,
replicator dynamics, spatial heterogeneity, metacommunity dynamics
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Introduction
Since its inception over 30 years ago evolutionary game theory has become a major theoretical1
framework for studying the evolution of frequency dependent systems in biology [Maynard Smith,2
1982, Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998, 2003]. There have been numerous applications of evolutionary3
game theory in biology (and increasingly also in economics and the social sciences), ranging from4
the evolution of cooperation [Axelrod, 1984, Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981] and animal conflicts5
[Maynard Smith and Price, 1973], to the evolution of sex ratios [Hamilton, 1967], and the origin of6
anisogamy [Parker et al., 1972]. Indeed it is striking that three of the simplest possible games that7
can be considered, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game [Axelrod, 1984], the Hawk-Dove (or Snowdrift)8
game [Maynard Smith, 1982], and the Rock-Paper-Scissor game [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998],9
have all found fruitful applications in the study of important biological problems, namely, the10
evolution of cooperation [Axelrod, 1984, Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981], the evolution of animal11
contests [Maynard Smith, 1982, Maynard Smith and Price, 1973], and the evolution of Red Queen12
dynamics [Sinervo and Lively, 1996, Kerr et al., 2002, Kirkup and Riley, 2004] (in which the system13
cycles constantly between the different possible strategies).14
In formulating evolutionary game theory it is often assumed that the individual strategists15
interact at random in a well-mixed population. Under this assumption the evolutionary game16
dynamics can be formulated as a system of ordinary differential equations, the replicator equations,17
which describe the time evolution of the different strategies in the game [Maynard Smith, 1982,18
Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998]. Any evolutionary stable strategies (i.e. a strategy, which if adopted19
by almost all members of the population, cannot be invaded by any mutant strategy) is a stable20
equilibrium of the replicator equations [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998].21
In many situations the assumption that the population is well-mixed, with individuals interact-22
ing randomly throughout the whole population, is not realistic. This will often be the case if there is23
some spatial structure in the population, which results in individuals interacting more with neigh-24
boring individuals than with more distant ones. One way of modeling a structured population is to25
assume that individuals are associated with the vertices of a graph, with two individuals interacting26
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if the corresponding vertices are connected by an edge. This approach leads to a network based27
formulation of evolutionary game theory in which the evolutionary dynamics on the graph is deter-28
mined by a suitable deterministic or stochastic analogue of the replicator dynamics. Evolutionary29
games on graphs have been rather well studied [Nowak and May, 1992, Killingback and Doebeli,30
1996, Nakamaru et al., 1997, Hauert and Szabo, 2003, Ifti et al., 2004, Hauert and Doebeli, 2004,31
Santos and Pacheco, 2005, Ohtsuki et al., 2006]. One of the basic conclusions of this work is that32
the evolutionary dynamics of a game on a graph can be quite different from the dynamics of the33
game in a well-mixed population. A particularly important instance of this is that cooperation can34
be maintained in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game on a graph. In contrast, in a well-mixed population35
cooperation is always driven to extinction by defection.36
An alternative way of modeling a structured population is to assume that it is composed of a37
number of local populations, within which individuals interact randomly, coupled by dispersal. In38
this approach the total population or community is modeled as a metapopulation or metacommu-39
nity. Metapopulation and metacommunity structure is known to have important implications for40
population dynamics in ecology and evolution [Hanski, 1999, Holyoak et al., 2005, Schreiber, 2010].41
In spite of the considerable amount of work that has been devoted to understanding the eco-42
logical and genetic consequences of metacommunity structure there has been much less attention43
devoted to studying the dynamics of evolutionary game theory in the metacommunity context.44
The purpose of this paper is to provide a general mathematical formulation of metacommunity45
evolutionary game dynamics, and to obtain detailed results for the case of a particularly interesting46
game – the rock-paper-scissors game. In the last few years the rock-paper-scissor game, which might47
initially seem to be of purely theoretical interest, has emerged as playing an important role in de-48
scribing the behavior of various real-world systems. These include the evolution of alternative male49
mating strategies in the side-blotched lizard Uta Stansburiana [Sinervo and Lively, 1996], the in50
vitro evolution of bacterial populations [Kerr et al., 2002, Nahum et al., 2011], the in vivo evolution51
of bacterial populations in mice [Kirkup and Riley, 2004], and the competition between genotypes52
and species in plant communities [Lankau and Strauss, 2007, Cameron et al., 2009]. More generally,53
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the rock-scissors-paper game – which is characterized by three strategies R, P and S, which satisfy54
the non-transitive relations: P beats R (in the absence of S), S beats P (in the absence of R), and55
R beats S (in the absence of P) – serves as a simple prototype for studying the dynamics of more56
complicated non-transitive systems [Buss and Jackson, 1979, Paquin and Adams, 1983, May and57
Leonard, 1975, Schreiber, 1997, Schreiber and Rittenhouse, 2004, Vandermeer and Pascual, 2005,58
Allesina and Levine, 2011].59
One of the central issues that has arisen in recent years in ecology is the degree to which meta-60
community structure can lead to the coexistence of competing species [Hanski, 1999, Amarasekare61
and Nisbet, 2001, Moquet et al., 2005, Gravel et al., 2010]. Here, we study an interesting aspect of62
this larger question, namely, the effect of a general metacommunity structure on the coexistence63
of the strategies in the rock-paper-scissor game. In a well-mixed population the evolutionary dy-64
namics of the rock-paper-scissor game is known to be determined by the sign of the determinant65
of the payoff matrix [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998]. If the determinant of the payoff matrix is66
positive then the replicator dynamics converges to a stable limit point, in which the frequencies of67
the three strategies tend to constant values. If, however, the determinant of the payoff matrix is68
negative then the replicator dynamics converges to a heteroclinic cycle, in which the frequencies69
of the three strategies continue to undergo increasingly extreme oscillations. In the latter case the70
frequencies of the different strategies successively fall to lower and lower levels as the population71
dynamics approach the heteroclinic attractor. Consequently, stochasticity would result in the ul-72
timate extinction of one of the strategies followed by the elimination of the remaining dominated73
strategy.74
In this paper we study the dynamics of the rock-scissors-paper game in a metacommunity75
context, and show that dispersal in spatially heterogeneous environments can alter dynamical out-76
comes. In particular, we characterize under what conditions dispersal in heterogeneous environ-77
ments stabilizes or destabilizes rock-paper-scissor metacommunities. When dispersal is stabilizing,78
all strategies in the rock-scissors-paper metacommunity are maintained indefinitely by a Red Queen79
type dynamic.80
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Model and Methods81
Evolutionary Games in Space.82
We consider interacting populations playing m distinct strategies (i = 1, . . . ,m) in a spatially83
heterogeneous environment consisting of n patches (r = 1, . . . , n). Space is the primary limiting84
resource for the populations and assumed to be fully saturated i.e. all sites within a patch are85
occupied. Let xri denote the frequency of strategy i in patch r. Within patch reproductive rates of86
individuals are determined by pairwise interactions where an individual in patch r playing strategy87
i receives a payoff of Aij(r) following an encounter with an individual playing strategy j. Individuals88
reproduce at a rate equal to their net payoff. For individuals playing strategy i in patch r, this89
net payoff equals
∑
iAij(r)x
r
j . All individuals in patch r experience a per-capita mortality rate m
r.90
Dying individuals free up space that can be colonized with equal likelihood by all offspring living91
in the patch. In the absence of dispersal, the probability that a site emptied by a dying individual92
gets colonized by an offspring playing strategy i is
∑
i Aij(r)x
r
jx
r
i∑
j,k Ajk(r)x
r
jx
r
k
. Thus, in the absence of dispersal,93
the population dynamics in patch r are94
dxri
dt
= −mr xri +mr
∑
j Aij(r)x
r
ix
r
j∑
j,k Ajk(r)x
r
jx
r
k
. (1)
To account for movement between patches, let dsr denote the fraction of progeny born in patch s95
that move to patch r. In which case, the rate at which offspring of strategy i arrive in patch r equals96 ∑
s dsr
∑
j Aij(s)x
s
ix
s
j and the probability an offspring playing strategy i colonizes an emptied site97
equals
∑
j Aij(s)x
s
ix
s
j∑
s dsr
∑
j,k Ajk(s)x
s
jx
s
k
. Hence, the full spatial dynamics are98
dxri
dt
= −mr xri +mr
∑
s dsr
∑
j Aij(s)x
s
ix
s
j∑
s dsr
∑
j,k Ajk(s)x
s
jx
s
k
. (2)
We assume that the matrix D of dispersal probabilities is primitive (i.e. after sufficiently many99
generations, the decedents of any individual in any one patch occupy all patches).100
For the rock-paper-scissor game, there are three strategies with rock as strategy 1, paper as101
strategy 2, and scissor as strategy 3. Let ar be the basal reproductive rate of an individual in patch102
r. Let bri (i.e. the benefit to the winner) be the payoff to strategy i in patch r when it wins against103
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its subordinate strategy, and −cri (i.e. the cost to the loser) be the payoff to strategy i in patch r104
when it loses against the dominant strategy. Under these assumptions, the payoff matrix in patch105
r is given by106
A(r) = ar +
 0 −cr1 br1br2 0 −cr2
−cr3 br3 0
 (3)
Throughout this article, we assume that ar > 0, 0 < cri < a
r, bri > 0. The assumption a
r > cri107
ensures that payoffs remain positive.108
Analytical and Numerical Methods109
To understand whether the strategies persist in the long-term, we analyze (2) using a combi-110
nation of analytical and numerical methods. Long-term persistence of all the strategies is equated111
with permanence: there exists a minimal frequency ρ > 0 such that112
xri (t) ≥ ρ for all i, r
whenever t is sufficiently large and all strategies are initially present (i.e.
∑
r x
r
i (0) > 0 for i =113
1, 2, 3). Permanence ensures that populations recover from rare large perturbations and continual114
small stochastic perturbations [Schreiber, 2007, Bena¨ım et al., 2008]. Using analytical techniques115
developed by Hofbauer and Schreiber [2010], we derive an analytical condition for permanence in116
terms of products of eigenvalues at the single strategy equilibria of the model. These criteria take117
on an explicit, interpretable form when (i) populations are relatively sedentary (i.e. drr ≈ 1 for118
all r) and (ii) populations are well mixed (i.e. there exists a probability vector v = (v1, . . . , vn)119
such that drs ≈ vs for all r, s). To better understand permanence at intermediate dispersal rates,120
we derive an analytical result about critical dispersal thresholds for persistence of metacommunity121
exhibiting unconditional dispersal (i.e probability of leaving a patch is independent of location) and122
numerically simulate (2) using the deSolve package of R [Team, 2008]. To simplify our exposition,123
we present our results under the assumption that mr = m and ar = a for all r i.e. there is only124
spatial heterogeneity in the benefits and in the costs. More general results are presented in the125
Appendices.126
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Figure 1. Boundary dynamics for rock-paper-scissors. For within patch and metacommunity dynamics, there
is a cycle of trajectories (i.e. heteroclinic cycle) connecting the pure strategy equilibria. In (a), the cycle is
repelling and the community persists. In (b), the cycle is attracting and the community is extinction prone.
Simulated metapopulations consist of 30 patches with all-to-all coupling for dispersing individuals and spatial
variation in payoffs (cr = 1 + (r− 1)/30, br = 0.85 cr, a = 3). The fraction dispersing equals d = 0.005 in (a)
and d = 0.5 in (b).
Results127
Local coexistence128
We begin by studying the behavior of the within-patch dynamics (1) in the absence of disper-129
sal. If only strategy i is present in patch r, then the per-capita growth rate of the strategy, call130
it j, dominated by strategy i is −mcri /a. Alternatively, the per-capita growth rate of the strat-131
egy j dominating strategy i equals mbri /a. The three single-strategy equilibria are connected by132
population trajectories in which dominant strategies replace subordinate strategies (Fig. 1). This133
cycle of population trajectories in patch j is known as a heteroclinic cycle [Hofbauer and Sigmund,134
1998]. Using average Lyapunov functions, time-one maps, or measure-theoretic techniques [Hof-135
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bauer, 1981, Krupa and Melbourne, 1995, Schreiber, 2000], one can show that the strategies in136
patch r locally coexist in the sense of permanence provided that the product of the invasion rates137
exceeds the product of the exclusion rates:138
∏
i
bri >
∏
i
cri . (4)
Interestingly, inequality (4) is equivalent to the determinant of the payoff matrix being positive.139
When coexistence occurs, the heteroclinic cycle of the boundary of the population state space is140
repelling and there is a positive global attractor for the within-patch dynamics (Fig. 1a) . When in-141
equality (4) is reversed, the heteroclinic cycle on the boundary is attracting (Fig. 1b). The strategies142
asymptotically cycle between three states (rock-dominated, paper-dominated, scissor-dominated),143
and the frequencies of the under-represented strategies asymptotically approach zero. Hence, all144
but one strategy goes extinct when accounting for finite population sizes.145
Metacommunity coexistence.146
Analytical results. When the patches are coupled by dispersal, we show in Appendix A that147
for any pair of strategies, the dominant strategy competitively excludes the subordinate strat-148
egy. Hence, as in the case of the dynamics within a single patch, the metacommunity exhibits a149
heteroclinic cycle on the boundary of the metacommunity phase space.150
Work of Hofbauer and Schreiber [2010] on permanence for structured populations (see Appendix151
B) implies that metapopulation persistence is determined by invasion rates and exclusion rates at152
single strategy equilibria. More specifically, consider the rock strategy equilibrium where xr1 = 1153
and xr2 = x
r
3 = 0 for all patches r. Linearizing the paper strategy dynamics at the rock equilibrium154
yields155
dxr2
dt
≈ −mxr2 +m
∑
s dsr(a+ b
s
2)x
s
2∑
s dsra
.
Equivalently, if x2 = (x
1
2, . . . , x
n
2 )
T where T denotes transpose, then156
dx2
dt
≈ (−mI +mΨDT (aI +B2))x2
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where I is the identity matrix, Ψ is the diagonal matrix with entries 1/
∑
s d1sa
s, . . . , 1/
∑
s dnsa
s,157
B2 is the diagonal matrix with diagonal entries b
1
2, . . . , b
n
2 , and D
T is the transpose of the dispersal158
matrix. Corresponding to the fact that the paper strategy can invade the rock strategy, the stability159
modulus of −mI + mΨDT (aI + B2) (i.e. the largest real part of the eigenvalues) is positive. Call160
this stability modulus I2, the invasion rate of strategy 2. Linearizing the scissor strategy dynamics161
at the rock equilibrium yields162
dx3
dt
≈ (−mI +mΨDT (aI − C3))x3
where C3 is the diagonal matrix with diagonal entries c
1
3, . . . , c
n
3 . Corresponding to the fact that163
scissor strategy is displaced by the rock strategy, the stability modulus of −mI +mΨDT (aI −C3)164
is negative. We call this negative of this stability modulus E3, the exclusion rate of strategy 3.165
By linearizing around the other pure strategy equilibria, we can define the invasion rates Ii for166
each strategy invading its subordinate strategy and the exclusion rates Ei for each strategy being167
excluded by its dominant strategy.168
Appendix A shows that the metapopulation persists if the product of the invasion rates exceeds169
the product of the exclusion rates:170
3∏
i=1
Ii >
3∏
i=1
Ei (5)
If the inequality (5) is reversed, then the metapopulation is extinction prone as initial conditions171
near the boundary converge to the heteroclinic cycle and all but one strategy is lost regionally.172
While inequality (5) can be easily evaluated numerically, one can not, in general, write down173
a more explicit expression for this permanence condition. However, when the metapopulation is174
weakly mixing (i.e. dispersal rates are low) or well-mixed (i.e. dispersal rates are high), we are able175
to find more explicit criteria. Furthermore, when dispersal is unconditional, we show that there is176
critical dispersal rate below which persistence is possible (Appendix C).177
At sufficiently low dispersal rates i.e drr ≈ 0 for all r, the metacommunity coexistence crite-178
rion (5) simplifies to179
3∏
i=1
max
r
bri >
3∏
i=1
min
r
cri . (6)
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Unlike the local coexistence criterion (4) which requires that the geometric mean of benefits exceeds180
the geometric mean of costs within a patch, inequality (6) requires that the geometric mean of the181
maximal benefits exceeds the geometric mean of the minimal costs. Here, the maxima and minima182
are taken over space. Thus, inequality (6) implies that localized dispersal promotes coexistence if183
there is sufficient spatial variation in relative benefits, costs, or mortality rates.184
For well-mixed metacommunities (i.e. drs ≈ vs for all r, s), the invasion rate Ii of the strategy185
is approximately m
∑
r b
r
i /a. Conversely, the exclusion rate Ei of strategy i is −m
∑
r c
r
i /a. These186
well-mixed metacommunities coexist provided that the geometric mean of the spatially averaged187
benefit exceeds the geometric mean of the spatially averaged cost:188
3∏
i=1
(
1
n
∑
r
bri
)
>
3∏
i=1
(
1
n
∑
r
cri
)
. (7)
Since (7) implies (6), it follows that persistence of well-mixed communities implies persistence of189
weakly-mixing communities, but not vice-versa. We can refine this observation under the assump-190
tion of unconditional dispersal.191
Unconditional dispersal occurs when the fraction of individuals dispersing, d, is independent of192
location. Let prs denote the fraction of dispersing individuals from patch r that end up in patch s193
i.e. psr is a dispersal kernel that describes how dispersing individuals redistribute across patches.194
Under these assumptions, the fraction drs of individuals in patch r dispersing to patch s 6= r equals195
d prs. The fraction drr of individuals remaining in patch r is 1 − d. In Appendix C, we show that196
there is a critical dispersal threshold d∗ (possibly 0 or 1) such that the metacommunity persists if197
its dispersal rate is below d∗ and is extinction prone when its dispersal rate is greater than d∗. It198
follows that if the metacommunity persists when highly dispersive (i.e. d∗ = 1), then it persists at199
all positive dispersal rates. Conversely, if a metacommunity is extinction prone when weakly mixing200
(i.e. (6) is violated), then it is extinction prone at all positive dispersal rates.201
Numerical results. To illustrate the implications our analytical results, we consider two scenarios202
where either there is only spatial variation in the payoffs or where there is within-patch and spatial203
variation in payoffs. There are n = 30 patches that are equally connected. A fraction d of individuals204
disperse and dispersing individuals are distributed equally amongst the remaining patches (i.e.205
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Figure 2. The effect of spatial variation and dispersal rate on the persistence criterion in (a) and the long-term
metapopulation frequencies in (b). Metapopulations consist of 30 patches with all-to-all coupling for dispers-
ing individuals and spatial variation in payoffs (cr = 1+(r−1)σ/30, br = 0.85 cr, a = 3). In (a), the difference
between the product
∏
i Ii of the invasion rates and the product
∏
i Ei of the exclusion rates are plotted
as function of the fraction d of dispersing individuals and the range σ of spatial variation in the payoffs.
Positive values correspond to persistence and negative values to the metapopulation being extinction prone.
The white curve is where the difference in products equals zero. In (b), the minimal and maximal frequencies
for one patch and the spatial average are plotted as a function of the fraction d of dispersing individuals and
σ. The white curve is where the difference in the products of invasion and exclusion rates equals zero.
drs = d/(n − 1) for r 6= s). For this form of dispersal, the metapopulation is well-mixed when206
d = (n− 1)/n in which case drs = 1/n for all r, s.207
First, we consider the case where there is spatial variation in payoffs, but all strategies within a208
patch fare equally well when they are the dominant player in an interaction and fare equally poorly209
when they are the subordinate player in the interaction (i.e. bri = b
r, and cri = c
r for all i = 1, 2, 3).210
Local coexistence requires that the benefit br to the winner must exceed the cost cr to the loser. For211
well-mixed communities, regional coexistence requires that the spatially averaged benefit 1n
∑
r b
r
212
must exceed the spatially averaged average cost 1n
∑
r c
r. From these two conditions, it follows that213
metapopulation persistence for well-mixed communities requires that at least one of the patches214
promotes local coexistence.215
12 S.J. Schreiber & T.P. Killingback
0.001 0.005 0.050 0.500
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
fraction dispersing
m
in
/m
ax
 fr
eq
ue
nc
y
local
regional
time 
pa
tc
he
s 
fraction disp =0.5 
fraction disp =0.02 
fraction disp =0.001 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
Figure 3. The effect of dispersal rates on metapopulation dynamics. Metapopulations consist of 30 patches
with all-to-all coupling for dispersing individuals and spatial variation in payoffs (cr = 1 + (r − 1)/30,
br = 0.85 cr, a = 3). In (a), the minimal and maximal frequencies for one patch and the spatial average are
plotted as a function of the fraction d of dispersing individuals. In (b)-(d), the spatial-temporal dynamics
are plotted for low, intermediate, and high dispersal rates. Rock frequencies are color-coded as indicated.
When all patches fail to promote local coexistence (i.e. cr > br for all r), weakly mixing meta-216
communities persist provided that the benefit in some patch exceeds the cost in another (possibly217
the same) patch i.e. maxr b
r > minr c
r. When this condition is meet, there is a critical dispersal218
threshold d∗ below which the metacommunity persists, and above which the metacommunity is219
extinction-prone.220
Figure 2a demonstrates the analytical prediction that the difference between the products of221
the invasion and exclusion rates is a decreasing function of the fraction d dispersing. Furthermore,222
the difference in products is an increasing function of the amplitude of the spatial variation in223
payoffs. Hence, the critical dispersal threshold increases with the amplitude of the spatial variation224
of the payoffs. Intuitively, higher dispersal rates are needed to average out greater spatial variation.225
Unlike the difference between the products of invasion and exclusion rates, the minimum frequency226
of strategies exhibits a highly nonlinear response to increasing dispersal rates (Fig 2b): the minimal227
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Figure 4. The effect of spatial variation and dispersal rate on the persistence criterion in (a) and long-term
metapopulation frequencies in (b). Metapopulations consist of 30 patches with all-to-all coupling for dis-
persing individuals. Each strategy has 10 patches in which their benefit equals bhigh and equals 0 in the
remaining patches. c = 1, a = 2, m = 0.1 in all patches. In (a), the difference between the product
∏
i Ii of
the invasion rates and the product
∏
i Ei of the exclusion rates are plotted as function of the fraction d of
dispersing individuals and the maximal benefit bhigh. Positive values correspond to persistence and negative
values to the metapopulation being extinction prone. The white curve is where the difference of products
equals zero. In (b), the minimal and maximal frequencies for one patch and the spatial average are plotted
as a function of the fraction d of dispersing individuals and the maximal benefit bhigh. The white curve is
where the difference in the products of invasion and exclusion rates equals zero.
frequency initially increases with dispersal rates, reaches a plateau of approximately one-third at228
intermediate dispersal rates, and decreasing abruptly to zero after crossing the critical dispersal.229
At low dispersal rates, metacommunity persistence is achieved by a spatial game of hide and230
seek (Figs. 3a,b). At any point in time, each strategy is at high frequency in some patches and231
low frequencies in the remaining patches. Strategy composition in each patch cycles as dominant232
strategies displace subordinate strategies. Intermediate dispersal rates stabilize the local and re-233
gional dynamics (Figs. 3a,c). As a consequence, local diversity is maximal at intermediate dispersal234
rates. At high dispersal rates, the population dynamics synchronize across space as they approach235
the heteroclinic cycle (Figs. 3a,d).236
For the second numerical scenario, we consider when payoffs vary within patches (e.g. rock gets237
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Figure 5. The effect of dispersal rates on metapopulation dynamics. Metapopulations consist of 30 patches
with all-to-all coupling for dispersing individuals. Each strategy has 10 patches in which their benefit equals
bhigh = 4 and equals 0 in the remaining patches. c = 1, a = 2, m = 0.1 in all patches. In (a), the minimal
and maximal frequencies for one patch and the spatial average are plotted as a function of the fraction d of
dispersing individuals. In (b)-(d), the spatial-temporal dynamics are plotted for low, intermediate, and high
dispersal rates. Rock frequencies are color-coded as indicated.
a higher benefit than scissor when playing their subordinate opponents in one patch, but scissor238
gets the higher benefit in another patch) as well as spatially. In this case, well-mixed communities239
can persist despite being locally extinction prone. To understand why, assume each strategy wins240
big in some patches but win nothing in others. Let f denote the fraction of patches where a241
strategy wins big and receives a payoff bhigh against its subordinate strategy. In the remaining242
fraction 1− f of patches, each strategy receives no benefit when playing against their subordinate243
strategy. Furthermore, assume that there is no variation in the costs cri = c for all i, r. Under244
these assumptions, local coexistence is impossible as c > bhigh · 0 = 0. In contrast, a well-mixed245
metacommunity persists if f bhigh > c and a weakly-mixing metacommunity persists if bhigh > c.246
Therefore, provided that bhigh is sufficiently large, coupling the communities by any level of dispersal247
mediates regional coexistence despite local communities being extinction prone.248
Consistent with these analytical predictions, Fig. 4 illustrates that metacommunity persists at249
all dispersal rates if the difference in payoffs is sufficiently great (bhigh > 3) and only persists at250
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low dispersal rates for intermediate differences in the payoffs. When there are large differences,251
metapopulation abundance and stability increases continually with dispersal rates (Fig. 5). In252
contrast, metapopulation abundance is maximized at intermediate dispersal rates whenever there253
are intermediate differences in the payoffs (Fig. 4b).254
Discussion255
The rock-paper-scissors game represents the prototypical situation in which the components of a256
system satisfy a set of non-transitive relations. It is a surprising and fascinating feature of recent257
work in evolutionary biology and ecology that such interactions have been discovered in a wide258
range of natural systems [Buss and Jackson, 1979, Sinervo and Lively, 1996, Kerr et al., 2002,259
Kirkup and Riley, 2004, Lankau and Strauss, 2007, Cameron et al., 2009]. The existence of non-260
transitive interactions in biological systems has been suggested as an important mechanism for261
maintaining biodiversity [Durrett and Levin, 1997, Kerr et al., 2002, Lankau and Strauss, 2007,262
Roelke and Eldridge, 2010, Allesina and Levine, 2011]. This suggestion, however, raises an important263
theoretical question: Is it possible for all components of such a system to persist in the long term?264
This question is pertinent since modeling the dynamics of the rock-paper-scissors game (and related265
non-transitive systems) using the replicator equation shows that cyclic behavior corresponds to266
convergence toward a heteroclinic attractor on the boundary of the strategy space, and this process267
must ultimately result in the extinction of some strategies [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998].268
It is widely believed in ecology that the inclusion of spatial structure, in which the interactions269
of individuals are local, can result in the coexistence of communities that could not persist in a270
panmictic situation [Durrett and Levin, 1997, Hanski, 1999, Amarasekare and Nisbet, 2001, Holyoak271
et al., 2005]. There are numerous ways in which a spatially structured population can be modeled272
mathematically, depending on the assumptions made regarding the nature of the spatial interactions273
of the individuals in the population [Durrett and Levin, 1994]. Possible approaches include reaction-274
diffusion systems [Cantrell and Cosner, 2003], metapopulation and metacommunity theory [Hanski,275
1999, Holyoak et al., 2005], coupled lattice maps [Hastings, 1993, Holland and Hastings, 2008], and276
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cellular automata and related lattice models [Nowak and May, 1992, Killingback and Doebeli, 1996,277
Durrett and Levin, 1997, 1998, Iwasa et al., 1998, Kerr et al., 2002].278
Most previous attempts to understand the effect of spatial structure on the persistence of sys-279
tems with non-transitive interactions have utilized cellular automata-type models [Durrett and280
Levin, 1997, 1998, Iwasa et al., 1998, Frean and Abraham, 2001, Kerr et al., 2002, Karolyi et al.,281
2005, Reichenbach et al., 2007, Rojas-Echenique and Allesina, 2011]. The main conclusion that can282
be drawn from these cellular automata studies is that in three-species systems with non-transitive283
interactions it is possible for all species to coexist in a spatially structured model even when they284
could not all persist in the corresponding panmictic system. Coexistence in these models when285
formulated in two spatial dimensions results from the different species aggregating in regions that286
cyclically invade each other. It is worth noting that in the reaction-diffusion approach of Nakamaru287
and Iwasa [2000] coexistence is not possible in one-dimensional systems. This issue has not, how-288
ever, been investigated using lattice models. Cellular automata models have the virtue of explicitly289
introducing space through a lattice of cells and of directly modeling the spatial interactions be-290
tween individuals. However, such models also have a number of significant limitations. Since spatial291
structure is introduced in a very concrete fashion, through an explicit choice of a spatial lattice292
(almost always taken to be a two-dimensional square lattice) and a spatial interaction neighborhood293
(usually taken to be the eight cells surrounding the focal cell) it is, in general, unclear how changes294
in these structures affect species coexistence. A second limitation of cellular automata models is295
the difficulty is using them to study the effects of spatial heterogeneity. In all the lattice models296
of non-transitive interactions that have been studied the rules determining how cells are updated297
are the same at every spatial location, although it is known, in general, that spatial heterogeneity298
may have important implications for species coexistence [Amarasekare and Nisbet, 2001]. A third299
limitation is that cellular automata are notoriously difficult to study analytically, and indeed almost300
all the key results on coexistence of species with non-transitive interactions in lattice models have301
been obtained from simulations (see, however, Durrett [2009]).302
In this paper we have adopted the metacommunity perspective to formulate a new approach303
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to studying the dynamics of spatially structured communities in which rock-paper-scissors-type in-304
teractions hold. This approach assumes that the overall metacommunity is composed of a number305
of local communities, within each of which the interactions are panmictic, and that the local pop-306
ulations are coupled by dispersal. The resulting metacommunity model allows for a very general307
treatment of the population dynamics of spatially structured systems with non-transitive inter-308
actions, which overcomes many of the limitations inherent in cellular automata-type models. In309
particular, our model allows a very general treatment of dispersal between spatial patches, includes310
spatial heterogeneity in a fundamental way, and allows precise analytic derivations of the central311
results.312
In our model, in the absence of dispersal, the population dynamics within each patch exhibits313
a heteroclinic cycle. Coexistence of all strategies in any given patch requires that the geometric314
mean of the benefits obtained from the payoff exceed the geometric mean of the costs within that315
patch. Moreover, when the spatial patches are coupled by dispersal the metacommunity possesses316
a heteroclinic cycle, and all members of the metacommunity persist when a regional coexistence317
criterion holds–the geometric mean of invasion rates when rare of the dominant strategies exceed318
the geometric mean of the exclusion rates when rare of the subordinate strategies. Although it is319
not possible, in general, to write down an explicit formula for the eigenvalues associated with these320
invasion and exclusion rates, it is possible to find more explicit expressions in the limiting cases of321
weakly-mixed metacommunities and well-mixed metacommunities. Weak mixing occurs when when322
dispersal rates are low. In this case, our analysis reveals that sufficient spatial heterogeneity in the323
payoffs for pairwise interactions allows metacommunity coexistence even when every local commu-324
nity is extinction prone. Thus, in the presence of spatial heterogeneity, local dispersal promotes325
coexistence. Alternatively, when dispersal rates are high, the metacommunity is well-mixed. In this326
case, the coexistence criterion requires that the geometric mean of spatially averaged benefits ob-327
tained from the payoff exceed the geometric mean of the spatially averaged costs. These coexistence328
criteria imply that the coexistence of a well-mixed metacommunity guarantees the coexistence of329
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the corresponding weakly mixed one. The converse result does not hold. Thus, metacommunities330
with higher dispersal rates are less likely to persist than those with lower ones.331
For unconditional dispersal (i.e. when the fraction d of individuals dispersing is independent332
of location), the interaction between spatial heterogeneity and dispersal leads to a threshold ef-333
fect: there exists a critical dispersal value d∗, such that if the dispersal rate is less than d∗ the334
metacommunity persists, while if the dispersal rate is greater than d∗ it is extinction prone. This335
threshold effect occurs whenever well-mixed communities are extinction prone but weakly-mixed336
communities are not. For example, there is sufficient spatial variation in the payoffs but the cost337
paid by the loser exceeds the benefit gained by the winner in every pairwise interaction. Similar338
dispersal thresholds have been demonstrated for two-species competitive communities exhibiting339
either priority effects or local competitive dominance [Levin, 1974, Amarasekare and Nisbet, 2001].340
However, unlike these transitive systems, regional coexistence for these intransitive systems does341
not require each species having regions in space where either they are initially more abundant or342
competitively dominant.343
Our results on the effect of dispersal on the coexistence of rock-paper-scissors metacommunities344
are in broad qualitative agreement with the conclusions that can be drawn from cellular automata-345
type models that include the movement of individuals, which is the lattice analogue of dispersal.346
Karolyi et al. [2005] considered a two-dimensional lattice model of non-transitive interactions in347
which individuals moved due to a chaotic flow, such as might occur in a fluid system. Reichenbach348
et al. [2007] also studied the effect of mobility on coexistence in a two-dimensional cellular automata349
model of rock-paper-scissors interactions, where individual movement was modeled using techniques350
of dimmer automata [Scho¨fisch and Hadeler, 1996]. In each case it was found through simulation351
that there exists a critical level of mobility, below which all species coexist and above which only352
one species survives in the long-term. This critical mobility level in lattice models of rock-paper-353
scissors interactions is the analogue of the critical dispersal rate d∗ in our metacommunity model.354
It is interesting to note in this context that a similar threshold also occurs in a model of cyclic355
interactions on complex networks studied by Szabo´ et al. [2004]. In this case if the fraction of356
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long-range interactions present in a small-world network is below a critical value coexistence of all357
species is possible, while if it is exceeded species extinctions occur.358
We also note that a further example of a lattice model that has been used to study the effect359
of spatial structure in maintaining meta-community persistence in a system with non-transitive360
interactions occurs in the area of prebiotic evolution. Eigen and Schuster [1979] observed that there361
is a fundamental problem in the evolution of self-replicating molecules: there exists an information362
threshold since the length of the molecule is restricted by the accuracy of the replication process.363
Eigen and Schuster proposed as a solution to this problem the concept of the hypercycle, in which364
a number of molecules catalyze the replication of each other in a cyclic fashion. The dynamics365
of a hypercycle can be modeled mathematically as a replicator equation with a cyclic payoff ma-366
trix [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998], and thus the hypercycle corresponds dynamically to a replicator367
system with non-transitive interactions. The concept of a hypercycle has, however, a crucial flaw:368
it is not evolutionarily stable - selection will favor the evolution of a parasitic mutant which does369
not provide any catalytic support to other molecules in the hypercycle even though it receives such370
catalytic support itself [Maynard-Smith, 1979, Bresch et al., 1980]. The evolution of parasitic mu-371
tants results in the collapse of hypercycles as entities capable of encoding information. Interestingly,372
the inclusion of spatial structure can prevent the evolution of selfish mutants and may result in373
the persistence of hypercycles. The effect of spatial structure on the persistence of hypercycles has374
been studied using a cellular automaton model in [Boerlijst and Hogeweg, 1991]. It is shown in375
this model that local spatial interactions result in the formation of self-organized spiral waves, and376
that selection acting between these spiral waves can counteract the effect of selection acting at the377
level of the individual molecules, with the consequence that the hypercycle can be resistant to the378
evolution of parasitic mutants.379
The metacommunity model we have introduced here provides a complementary approach to380
the lattice models that have previously been used to study coexistence in rock-paper-scissors-type381
systems. It seems likely that each type of model will most naturally describe different types of382
empirical systems with non-transitive interactions. For example, the lattice modeling approach383
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may describe reasonably well an in vitro microbial population growing on a plate [Kerr et al.,384
2002]. In contrast, our metacommunity model would seem to be a more natural approach to use385
to describe an in vivo microbial population inhabiting many host organisms with transmission386
between the hosts, as in the model system of Kirkup and Riley [2004], or plant communities living387
on different soil types [Lankau and Strauss, 2007, Cameron et al., 2009]. This observation raises388
the possibility that it may be possible to use such systems to empirically test the predictions of our389
metacommunity model.390
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